INTRODUCTION w x
In a simple and thought-provoking exercise, Lucas 8 estimated the welfare cost of business cycle fluctuations, using the preferences of a representative agent. By plugging hypothetical consumption streams into the agent's utility function, Lucas calculated the gain from eliminating business cycles altogether as the minimum percentage increase in the level of consumption in every period needed to render the agent indifferent between a consumption stream with a realistic variance-about-trend and a deterministic one with the same average growth rate. The striking conclusion of Lucas's analysis was that the gain from eliminating business cycles was quite smallᎏeliminating business cycles was equivalent, in Lucas's most risk-averse agent's eyes, to at most a 0.17% increase in the level oḟ w x consumption in all periods. Imrohoroglu 5 later performed a Lucas-typě experiment in an environment with many individual agents facing idiosyncratic, imperfectly insurable income risk. While Imrohoroglu found costš larger than those calculated by Lucas, her upper boundᎏfor an economy in which the only means of ''self-insurance'' available to agents is a storage technology, and for the highest level of risk-aversion which she considers ᎏis a 1.3% increase in the average level of consumption needed to Ž . compensate agents in an ex ante sense for living in an environment with business cycles.
This paper extends Lucas's analysis to the consideration of alternative specifications of individuals' preferences toward risk and intertemporal substitution, as well as alternative specifications of the stochastic process governing consumption growth.
Evidence on consumption growth and asset returnsᎏe.g., the equity premium puzzleᎏcasts at least some doubt on whether the standard isoelastic, expected-utility preference specification employed by both Lucas and Imrohoroglu is the ''correct'' one. Whether the quantitativě estimates obtained in those earlier exercises are robust to plausible deviations from the standard specification is worth examining, particularly as the earlier estimates, if correct, have rather strong policy implications. To quote Lucas: w x The exercise suggests that the main social gains from a deeper understanding of business cycles, whatever form this deeper understanding may take, will be in helping us to see how to avoid large mistakes with policies that have minimally inefficient side-effects, not in devising ever more subtle policies to remove the residual amount Ž w x . of business-cycle risk. Lucas 8, p . 31 w x The class of preferences I consider, employed by Epstein and Zin 2 in a study of the equity premium puzzle, encompasses the standard isoelastic specification as well as several ''non-expected-utility'' specifications, including preferences which allow a separation of the parameters governing risk aversion and intertemporal substitution, and preferences which display first-order risk aversion. ''First-order risk aversion'' means that the risk premium associated with a small gamble is proportional to the standard deviation of the gamble, rather than the variance; if the gamble is truly small, the standard deviation will be larger than the variance.
In terms of consumption processes, I considerᎏin addition to the deterministic-trend-plus-i.i.d.-disturbances specification used by Lucasᎏ processes which allow for a greater persistence of shocks to consumption. In particular, I also calculate business cycle costs using consumption processes in which business cycle fluctuations are represented by autocorrelated shocks about a deterministic trend or as stochastic fluctuations in the growth rate of consumption itself. In the years since the work of w x Nelson and Plosser 10 , there has been no clear consensus on whether business cycle fluctuations in macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption are more adequately described as transitory fluctuations about deterministic trends or as disturbances with more permanent consequences. The experiments in this paper show that the costs associated with business cycle fluctuations in consumption can, in fact, vary a great deal with changes in the posited stochastic process for consumption. Moreover, the experiments show that the preference parameters which matter most in determining the cost of fluctuations depend crucially on the degree of persistence of shocks to consumption. w x Consistent with the results of Pemberton 11 , I find that when one allows preferences which display first-order risk aversion, the welfare cost of business cycle fluctuations in consumption is potentially much higheṙ than the estimates calculated by either Lucas or Imrohoroglu. However, Ǐ find that the magnitude of the welfare cost is potentially much higher than even Pemberton's estimates, depending on whether business cycle fluctuations in consumption are treated as i.i.d. disturbances around a linear deterministic trend, autocorrelated disturbances around a linear trend, or fluctuations in the growth rate of consumption. While adding persistence to consumption shocks very naturally raises the welfare cost of business cycles across all utility specifications, the experiments below show that for first-order risk-averse preferences, the effect of adding persistence is particularly dramatic. For the expected utility case considered by Lucas, taking account of the persistence of shocks to consumption can raise the cost estimates from 1r10% of initial consumption to roughly 0.5%. For first-order risk-averse preferences, costs on the order of 1% in the i.i.d. case can rise as high as 23% in the stochastic growth case, for extreme amounts of risk aversion, with requisite consumption increases on the order of 2᎐5% for even a moderate degree of risk aversion. In contrast, the largest cost estimate reported in Pemberton is 1.09% of initial consumption. 1 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the preference specification which will be employed in the subse-1 This figure is also for a degree of risk aversion much greater than any which we consider below. Pemberton also measures the cost of business cycles simply as the risk premium associated with a timeless binary gamble between two consumption levels, calibrated to have a variance equal to the variance of Hodrick᎐Prescott detrended per capita consumption. The experiments I report on below solve for the stochastic process for a representative individual's lifetime utility, thus highlighting the interaction between aversion to risk and willingness to substitute intertemporally. The cost of business cycles, as shown below, depends on both. quent analysis and discusses some of its key features. Section 3 describes the experiment, which is ''Lucas-like'' in character. Section 4 presents the results. Details of the solution methods are contained in an appendix.
INTERTEMPORAL RISK PREFERENCES

The General Intertemporal Framework
The preferences which I employ in this paper are recursive, with lifetime utility at each date a function of known current consumption and a ''certainty equivalent'' value of random lifetime utility from the next period onward. A special case of this form is the standard intertemporal expected utility specification. The treatment here is somewhat heuristic; more w x details can be found in Epstein and Zin 2 .
The most general specification of this class of preferences assumes that lifetime utility from date t onward is a function of known consumption at date t and a certainty equivalent of random future utility,
where и : I I is a certainty equivalent operator, conditional on informat w x tion I I available at date t, and W is, in the language of Koopmans 6 , an t ''aggregator.'' The precise form for the aggregator W which I employ, as in w x Epstein and Zin 2 , has a constant elasticity of substitution between current consumption and certainty-equivalent future utility, 
Ž .
Thus, lifetime utility evolves according to
Ž .
The parameter is assumed to satisfy -1, / 0. Ž . The properties of 1 for deterministic consumption streams are well known. For deterministic streams, U is ordinally equivalent to
where u s U r. Thus, for evaluating deterministic consumption streams, t t the parameter ␤ is simply the individual's utility discount factor, while Ž . 1r1y corresponds to the individual's elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Risk Preferences
The individual's attitudes toward risk depend on the precise form which is assumed for the certainty equivalent .
2 In all cases, is assumed to be linearly homogeneous in the sense that
w x for all constants . As shown by Epstein and Zin 2 , for appropriate Ž . choices of , the utility process 1 subsumes as special cases the standard, isoelastic, expected-utility preferences used by Lucas and Imrohoroglu, thě w x w x non-expected-utility preferences used by Epstein and Zin 1 , 3 in their study of consumption and asset returns, as well as intertemporal extenw x w x sions of the sort of risk preferences formulated by Quiggin 12 , Yaari 15 , and others.
To formulate the different cases precisely, though, requires concrete assumptions about the nature of the stochastic consumption process. In the experiments below, I consider consumption paths which consist of stationary disturbances around a deterministic time trend and paths with growth rates which follow first-order Markov processes, as in the equity premium literature. To proceed immediately to these particular cases, though, would tend to obscure the nature of the risk preferences implied by different specifications of the certainty equivalent .
For Ž .
Ž Ž .. Ž Ž .. Suppose also that the states are ordered so that U s 1 F U s 2 F иии Ž Ž .. F U s n , and consider the following certainty equivalent of future utility, Ž . conditional on today's state being s s s i :
w x for ␥ g 0, 1 and ␣ F 1. The notation above assumes, naturally, that Ý y1 P s 0. When n s 2, for example, we have
for the n s 2 case; more generally, when ␥ s 1, we have
.ž / and the resulting utility process is identical to that considered by Epstein w x w x and Zin in their study of asset returns and consumption, 1 , 3 ᎏi.e.,
For this specification, the parameter ␣ governs risk aversionᎏwhich increases as ␣ shrinksᎏand the parameter governs intertemporal substitution for deterministic consumption streams. Ž . If, in addition, ␣ s , the utility process 1 becomes ordinally equivalent to the standard isoelastic, expected utility formulation,
where u ' U r, since ␥ s 1 and ␣ s imply
If ␥ -1, we have a ''rank-dependent'' certainty equivalent, which displays first-order risk aversion. The rank dependence is most easily seen in Ž .
Ž . 3 ᎏin a sense, the probability of the worse outcome, s 1 , is transformed from P to P ␥ , while that of the better outcome becomes 1 y P ␥ . One
cannot ''relabel'' the states and their associated probabilitiesᎏtaking state one into state two and state two into state oneᎏwithout affecting the evaluation. Which outcome is worse matters for the evaluation. When we also have ␣ s 1, is precisely the type of certainty equivalent w x which derives from Yaari's 15 ''dual theory'' of choice under uncertainty,
in the n s 2 case, and more generally,
Here, ␥ measures risk aversion, with ␥ s 1 corresponding to risk neutrality, and risk aversion growing as ␥ declines. In contrast to expected utility, the Yaari certainty equivalent is linear in payoffsᎏwhich are here the values of Uᎏand nonlinear in probabilities. 3 In the more general case, where neither ␥ nor ␣ is necessarily equal to one, both parameters matter for risk aversion, which increases as either ␥ or ␣ falls. w x As noted by Epstein and Zin 2 , when ␥ -1, the certainty equivalent displays ''first-order'' risk aversionᎏthat is, the risk premium it generates for a small gamble is proportional to the standard deviation of the gamble, rather than the variance. 4 As I discuss below, and as is discussed in Epstein w x and Zin 2 , this is an important feature which allows risk preferences of this class to be calibrated so as to give plausible answers to questions about a wide range of risks; it is also a feature which accounts for their better performance with respect to the equity premium puzzle than the standard isoelastic expected utility specification. 3 It is worth noting that the axioms for Yaari's dual theory are identical to those for the expected utility theory, with the exception of the 'independence axiom' of the latter. Yaari's theory replaces this with a 'dual independence axiom' which, as Yaari notes, is equivalent to requiring that the ranking of two lotteries with payoff vectors x and y is the same as the Ž . Ž . ranking of lotteries with payoffs ␣ x q 1 y ␣ z and ␣ y q 1 y ␣ z for all z's which are not hedges against either x or y. 
Which Specification Is More Plausible?
If one is willing to use the preferences of a representative agent tȯ gauge the costs associated with business cyclesᎏor, as in Imrohoroglu, thě preferences of many identical agentsᎏone has to be sensitive to the question of whether these preferences are plausible descriptions of individuals' attitudes toward risk. The case for the standard, isoelastic, expected utility specification, I suspect, rests largely on a combination of great tractability and consistency with certain important long-run observationsᎏ e.g., fairly constant consumption growth and a lack of any discernible trend in the real return to capital. Yet, all of the specifications aboveᎏwhich have, for deterministic paths of consumption, constant intertemporal elasticities of substitution and fixed discount factorsᎏare consistent with the same long-run observations.
What we do know from the literature on the equity premium puzzle, is that the standard isoelastic specification, when coupled with a frictionless Arrow᎐Debreu environment, fails to rationalize the data on the variability of consumption growth and the structure of asset returns, particularly the level of the risk-free interest rate and the rate spread between risky and riskless assets. Of course, this failure could be due to the presence in reality of important trading frictions not captured in the Arrow᎐Debreu w x framework. On the other hand, Epstein and Zin 2 , while maintaining the assumption of a frictionless trading environment, find that the preference specifications above which are first-order risk averseᎏthose with ␥ -1ᎏcan come closer to matching the equity premium data than the standard specification. 5 A key feature of both the standard isoelastic, expected utility class of preferences, as well as the earlier Epstein and Zin specificationᎏthe two ''second-order'' risk averse cases above, in which ␥ s 1ᎏis that plausible risk premia for small gambles can only be obtained by setting the risk aversion coefficient so large as to make it the case that an agent whose preferences have been calibrated to give plausible answers to questions about small gambles will almost certainly give implausible answers to questions about large gambles. w x The ''willingness to pay'' calculations in Epstein and Zin 2 are instructive in this regard. Using the certainty equivalents above, they calculate the amounts an individual with initial wealth of $75,000 would be willing to pay to avoid timeless gambles which add or subtract, with equal probabilities, sums ranging from $250 to $74,000. For cases with ␥ s 1, it is 5 w x w x See Mehra and Prescott 9 for evidence on the standard specification. Weil 14 considers ''non-expected-utility'' preferences of the sort formulated in Epstein and Zin in their earlier w x w x work, 1 , 3 , and shows that the model's ability to match the data on consumption growth and asset returns is not enhanced. First-order risk aversion is important in this respect.
necessary to drive the risk aversion parameter ␣ down to ␣ s y29 to generate a willingness to pay even $12.48 to avoid the $250 gamble. The problem, of course, is that an individual with ␣ s y29 would be willing to pay nearly $74,000ᎏ$73,975.81, to be exactᎏto avoid the gamble of size $74,000. In the first-order risk-averse case, with ␣ s 0.75 and ␥ s 0.5, these numbers are $103.64 for the $250 gamble and $43,809.83 for the $74,000 gamble. I find both of these numbersᎏ$103.64 and $43,809.83ᎏa bit large for my own tastes, but they are answers which one would not call wildly risk averse, and they both seem about in the right general area. Taking ␥ s 0.87 and ␣ s 0.75, say, yields numbers around $24 and $21,000 for the two gamblesᎏwhich, if anything, would be called, at most, a moderate aversion to risk. The essential point, though, is that the first-order risk-averse certainty equivalent yields answers which are at least plausible for a wider range of gambles than do the certainty equivalents with ␥ s 1.
w x This feature derives from the fact, noted in Epstein and Zin 2 , that both specifications with ␥ s 1 are ''smooth at certainty.'' To see what is meant by this, in the context of the framework above, consider the certainty equivalents of random future utility for the case where there are two states, occurring with probabilities p and 1 y p. For certainty equiva-Ž . lents with ␥ s 1, the locus of payoffs U , U which are indifferent to some 1 2 u with certainty, i.e.,
Ž . forms a smooth indifference curve in the space of pairs U , U , with slope 1 2 Ž . ypr1yp at ''certainty,'' the 45Њ line. Loosely, one can visualize aversion to a small gamble as the gap, near the 45Њ line, between this indifference curve and the locus of pairs with expected value equal to Ž . uᎏin other words, the set of pairs U , U satisfying 1 2
which is tangent to the indifference curve at the certainty point, and Ž . represents the indifference curve for a risk-neutral ␣ s 1 individual. Generating any significant amount of risk aversion near the certainty point requires a large amount of curvatureᎏ␣ large in absolute valueᎏsince the indifference curve is smooth at the certainty point. Certainty equivalents with ␥ s 1 are, in a sense, locally risk neutral. The upshot of taking the risk aversion parameter ␣ to be large enough in absolute value to generate a plausible aversion to small gambles, though, is extreme aversion for gambles with payoffs further away from the certainty point.
When ␥ / 1, the indifference curve is kinked at the certainty pointᎏa consequence of the rank dependence which results when ␥ -1, that is, the dependence of the evaluation on whether the state-one payoff is higher than the state-two payoff or vice versa. If ␣ s 1, the indifference curve is ␥ Ž ␥ . in fact piecewise linear, with a slope of yp r 1 y p above the 45Њ lineᎏoutcomes where the state-one payoff is worseᎏand a slope of Ž Ž . ␥ . Ž . ␥ y 1 y 1 y p r 1 y p belowᎏoutcomes where the state-two payoff is worse. 6 When ␣ -1, the piecewise linearity is removed, but the kink at certainty remains. The presence of the kink at certainty is the feature of these risk preferences which makes it possible to generate plausible levels of aversion to small gambles without generating implausible levels of aversion to large gambles. 7 Given that individuals do show some aversion to small gambles but are not so averse to large gambles as to prefer practically nothing with certainty to a gamble with a 50% chance of leaving them with practically nothing, and given the obvious need to parsimoniously parameterize individuals' risk preferences, the rank-dependent, first-order risk-averse certainty equivalents above would seem good candidates for the task of modeling individuals' risk preferences.
A LUCAS-TYPE EXPERIMENT
As in Lucas's experiment, I consider a representative agent's evaluation of alternative hypothetical stochastic consumption streams. For each posited consumption process, and using different specifications of the agent's intertemporal preferences, I calculate the minimum percentage increase in initial consumption needed to compensate the agent for a switch from a world of certaintyᎏin which the disturbances to consumption have a zero varianceᎏto a world in which the disturbances to consumption have a variance calibrated to be realistic. The subsections below describe in turn the alternative consumption processes, solution methods, and information about model calibration. w x As Epstein and Zin 2 discuss, were ␣ s 1ᎏso that ␥ alone determined the agent's risk aversionᎏthen calibrating ␥ to give a plausible degree of aversion to small gambles would yield an agent who was not averse enough to large gambles. Thus, the role of ␣ is in generating sufficient aversion to large gambles in conjunction with a plausible aversion to small gambles. Finally, as in much of the equity premium literature, I consider consumption streams with growth rates which follow autoregressive processes ᎏi.e., consumption processes with c rc s ,
Ä 4 where is a stationary autoregressive processᎏin particular,
where u is i.i.d. with mean zero. This implies that innovations to the t growth rate of consumption have a permanent effect on the level of consumption; in logarithms, consumption would follow a random walk with serially correlated disturbances. This specification, I think, better captures the features of U.S. per capita consumption than the linear time trend specification used by Lucas, although the true data-generating process no doubt lies somewhere between the two extremes.
Solving for the Agent's Lifetime Utility
For computational purposes, I approximate the consumption processes using finite-state Markov chains. In all cases, I derive a solution for the stochastic process of lifetime utility, suitably normalizedᎏeither by ex-Ž . tracting a deterministic trend in the cases where consumption obeys 4 or by normalizing by the level of current consumption when the consumption Ž . process is 6 ᎏby iteratively solving an appropriate functional equation. The normalized lifetime utility levels can then be expressed in terms of the values of the disturbances , which take on values in a finite set, Ä 4 , , . . . , . Ž .
Ž . Ž . Equations 7 and 8 are functional equationsᎏor more precisely, given the finite-state Markov chain assumption, systems of nonlinear equations in n unknownsᎏwhich can be solved iteratively for the normalized life-Ž . Ž Ž . Ž . Ž .. time utility functions¨ s¨ ,¨ , . . . ,¨ which satisfy them. 1 2 n
In each case, having solved for normalized lifetime utility in the n states, I then calculate the certainty equivalent of normalized lifetime utility according to , using the Markov chain's invariant probabilities over the Ž . states, p s p , p , . . . , p . Since we will be interested in variations in the 1 2 n Ž . standard deviation of the disturbances, let V denote the certainty equivalent of normalized lifetime utility obtained via the above procedure for a given standard deviation . That is,
Ž . where¨ is the solution for normalized lifetime utility when is the standard deviation of the disturbances .
Because of the linear homogeneity of the aggregator and certainty equivalent, the proportionate increase in initial consumption needed to render the agent indifferent between two environments with standard deviations of and ) is the value of which satisfies
Note also that in all cases, scaling up initial consumption by the factor 1 q raises, in an expected sense, consumption in all future periods in the proportion 1 q as wellᎏso can also be thought of as a proportionate increase, on average, in consumption in every period. Using the ''long run'' certainty equivalent of lifetime utility, which uses the Markov chain's invariant probabilities, to make welfare comparisons requires some justification. In all of the cases I consider, an individual's lifetime utility from today onward depends on which state the economy is in today. 9 We could ask the agent how much he or she is willing to pay to move from a particular state in one environmentᎏi.e., a world with one ᎏto a particular state in another environmentᎏa world with another . Evaluating two consumption processes with different 's according to their ''long run'' certainty equivalents V amounts, as I see it, to asking the agent to evaluate, in an ex ante sense, the choice of living in two different environments. For that question, the proper probabilities to useᎏfrom behind a ''veil of ignorance,'' so to speakᎏare the invariant probabilities of the n states.
The experiments which I perform, as in Lucas, calculate for switches from a world of certainty to a world with a realistic , other things constant, for various values of the preference parameters , ␥ , and ␣. Throughout the experiments, the discount factor ␤ will be held constant. The value I use for ␤ is 1.03 y0.25 , which would imply a 3% steady-state real interest rate.
Calibrating the Consumption Processes
To perform these experiments, we need to calibrate the parameters of the consumption processes for the ''realistic'' environment. The data I use are the Citibase quarterly series on consumption of nondurables and services from first quarter 1947 to second quarter 1992. It is natural to exclude durables: purchases of durablesᎏwhich is what is measuredᎏhave high variability, though we know that consumption of the services of durables is probably much smoother. The population data used to obtain per capita consumption are the U.S. Census monthly data on all citizens, averaged over quarters.
An OLS regression of the logarithm of per capita consumption on a constant and a linear time trendᎏfor the cases where consumption Ž . follows 4 ᎏyields an estimate of the quarterly growth rate equal to 0.5%, or about 2% annually. The standard deviation of the residuals from this Ž . regression is 0.0271. A subsequent AR 1 fit to the residualsᎏfor the case Ž . of 5 ᎏgives a coefficient of a s 0.9849.
In the case where consumption growth follows an autoregressive process Ž .
Ž . 6 , fitting a simple AR 1 to per capita consumption growth yields esti-Ž .Ž . mates of a s 0.2163 and 1 y a 1 q g s 0.7871, implying 1 q g s 1.0043 ᎏa 0.43% quarterly growth rate, or a 1.73% annual growth rate of per capita consumption. The standard deviation of the residuals from this regression is 0.0056, implying that the unconditional standard deviation of is s 0.0057.
t
I use standard n-state Markov chain representations which capture unconditional means and standard deviations, as well as autocorrelation. 10 In each case the invariant probabilities over the n states place approximately 70% of the mass of the distribution within "3r4th standard deviations from the mean. Thirty percent of the mass is at or outside "1.10 standard deviations.
RESULTS
I divide the results below into three cases corresponding to the three stochastic processes governing consumptionᎏthat is, i.i.d. disturbances Ž . about a linear trend 4 , autocorrelated disturbances about a linear trend Ž . Ž . Ž . 4 and 5 , or the AR 1 process for consumption growth 6 . For each process, I then present welfare cost figures for each specification of risk preferences. The specifications of risk preferences can be divided into two cases, according to whether the certainty equivalent employed is ''smooth Ž . Ž . at certainty'' ␥ s 1 or ''kinked''ᎏi.e., first-order risk averse ␥ -1 . The first, ''smooth'' case encompasses both the standard isoelastic expected Ž . utility specification in which ␣ s and the generalization of the stanŽw x w x. dard specification used by Epstein and Zin 1 , 3 in their theoretical and empirical analyses of the consumption-based CAPM. The first-order riskaverse case can be divided into what one might call a pure ''Yaari'' Ž . specification in which ␣ s 1 and a more general first-order risk-averse Ž . specification ␣ -1 .
As will become clear below, for the experiments here, whether ␣ is equal to one or is slightly less than one does not make a great deal of w x difference, much as in Epstein and Zin 2 . Intuitively, ␣ would figure more prominently if the ''gambles'' involved were larger. It is the kink at certainty, which owes to the fact that ␥ -1, that matters most for small gambles; taking ␣ -1 is important only for combining plausible aversion to small gambles with plausible aversion to large gambles. Consequently, we will make only one reference to the ␣ -1 case, in the first experiment, with the remainder of the ␥ -1 results assuming ␣ s 1.
Consumption: a Linear Trend Plus i.i.d. Disturbances
We begin, as in Lucas, with a consumption process which consists, in logarithmic form, of a linear time trend plus i.i.d. disturbances ᎏi.e., the Ž . process given in 4 .
Results for Smooth Certainty Equi¨alents
We initially set ␥ s 1 and consider ''smooth'' certainty equivalents of the form Ž . The utility processᎏgiven in normalized form in 7 ᎏcorresponds to Žw x w x. that employed by Epstein and Zin 1 , 3 , with the parameter governing attitudes toward intertemporal substitution for deterministic consumption streams and ␣ governing risk aversion for timeless gambles. In fact, 1 y ␣ is the agent's Arrow᎐Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion for Ž . timeless gambles, while 1r 1 y is the agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution for deterministic consumption streams. In this case, ␣ s 1 corresponds to risk neutrality, and risk aversion rises as ␣ decreases. If ␣ s , these preferences correspond to the expected utility preferences employed by Lucas.
The first case we will look at is, in fact, that of expected utility. In this case, the coefficient of relative risk aversion for timeless gambles, 1 y ␣ , is Ž equal to the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1r 1 y . . The welfare cost values are reported in Table I , for coefficients of Ž . relative risk aversion equal to 2, 5, 10 and 20ᎏi.e., for values of ␣ or equal to y1, y4, y9, and y19. The entries in the table are the percentage increases in consumption needed to compensate the agent for a switch from a world of certainty to a world with a realistic variance of the disturbances to consumptionᎏi.e., the entries are 100 times the values of Ž . satisfying 9 . The welfare cost values range from just under a 0.04% increase in consumption to just under a 0.70% increase in consumption for a switch from certainty to a realistic variance. In per capita dollar termsᎏtaking U.S. annual per capita consumption to be about $20,000ᎏthese costs are on the order of $7.34 to $139 per person per year.
The upper end of this range, which corresponds to a value of 1 y s 1 y ␣ s 20, is quite a bit larger than what Lucas obtained for the same risk aversion coefficient; for a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to 20, Lucas obtained a value slightly less than 2r10%. One would expect the numbers reported here to be somewhat larger, however, since the ''realistic'' standard deviation used in these calculations is the estimate s 0.0271 rather than the s 0.013 used by Lucas and Pemberton. Allowing ␣ to differ from yields no cost value greater than the 0.6958% of Table Iᎏat least for ␣ and taking on values in the same rangeᎏthough one interesting result does come out when we allow the agent's degree of risk aversion and willingness to substitute intertemporally to vary independently. In particular, as Table II below shows, the proper interpretation of the numbers in Table I is not that the welfare cost of business cycles rises as the agent becomes more risk averseᎏthough this is, of course, correct in a technical senseᎏbut, rather, the welfare cost of business cycles rises as the agent becomes less willing to substitute over time. Table II shows the percentage increases in consumption needed to compensate the agent for a switch from certainty to a realistic variance, for various combinations of ␣ and . The ''degree of risk aversion'' values shown in the table are values of 1 y ␣ for ␣ s y1, y4, y9, and y19.
Ž . The ''elasticity of intertemporal substitution'' values are values of 1r 1 y as s y1, y4, y9, or y19. Note that the main ''diagonal'' of the table ᎏentries where ␣ s ᎏsimply replicates the numbers in Table I .
As one can see, the largest cost value remains 0.6958, or a little less than a 7r10% increase in initial consumption; this value occurs where the agent is most risk averse and least willing to substitute over time. Looking across the rows and down the columns of the table, one sees the ''interesting result'' mentioned above: at least for this consumption process, the agent's willingness to substitute intertemporally has a much larger impact on the cost of fluctuations in consumption than does the agent's aversion to risk. In particular, for a given elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the influence of the degree of risk aversion parameter on the cost values is fairly negligible; on the other hand, for a given degree of risk aversion, the costs vary substantially with the agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
Results for First-order Risk-a¨erse Certainty Equi¨alents
We now turn to consider the first-order risk-averse preferences which obtain when we take ␥ -1 in the certainty equivalent operator . The Ž . certainty equivalent of normalized future utility¨ then has the form
Ž . The utility process is again given by 7 , and, in this case of i.i.d. disturbances, there is no dependence of on the current state. Setting ␣ s 1 in this certainty equivalent corresponds to what I have called the ''Yaari'' case. When ␣ s 1, ␥ alone governs risk aversionᎏwith smaller ␥ corresponding to greater aversion to riskᎏwhile again governs intertemporal substitution for deterministic streams. How risk averse is an individual with ␥ s 0.87? The ''degrees of risk aversion'' values in the table can be put into perspective by reconsidering the ''willingness to pay'' calculations discussed in Section 2.3 above. For an Ž . individual with initial wealth of $75,000, faced with a timeless gamble which adds or subtracts, with equal probability, $250 from the individual's wealth, the individual's willingness to pay to avoid the gamble, for the ␥ values used in Table III, is presented in Table IV . Thus, an individual with risk preferences of the form used in this section, whose degree of risk aversion was ␥ s 0.87, would be willing to pay $23.57 to get out of the $250 gamble. While there is certainly room for argument here, I would To see that there is little consequence to whether ␣ is equal to one or is slightly less than one, as argued above, Table V replicates the experiment in Table III for a value of ␣ s 0.75. As is clear, the results are virtually identical. Consequently, in the experiments below, we will restrict our attention to the case of ␣ s 1.
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Finally, note that while the results in Tables III and V show that with first-order risk aversion there is a greater dependence of the cost of fluctuations on the agent's degree of risk aversion than in the ''smooth'' case, much of the variation in the cost values even in the first-order risk-averse case is still due to variation in the agent's willingness to substitute intertemporally. This is particularly true if one looks at the rows of Tables III and V, which correspond to values of ␥ other than the two most extreme degrees of risk aversion, ␥ s 0.75 and ␥ s 0.70. If business cycle fluctuations in consumption are really best described as i.i.d. shocks around a linear deterministic trend, then it is not enough simply to get individuals' risk preferences ''correct''ᎏthe accuracy of one's measure of the cost of those fluctuations will still depend crucially on the accuracy with which one measures individuals' willingness to substitute consumption over time.
Consumption: A Linear Trend Plus Autocorrelated Disturbances
In this section, we repeat the previous experiments for the case where the log level of consumption consists of stationary disturbances about a Ž . linear trend 4 , as before, but with the disturbances following the first-Ž . order autoregression described in 5 with coefficient given by the estimate a s 0.9849 taken from the data. Normalized lifetime utility follows the Ž . same recursion as in the previous section given in Eq. 7 , except that now the certainty equivalent of normalized future utility depends on the realization of today's disturbance.
Results for Smooth Certainty Equi¨alents
We again begin by looking at the case where ␥ s 1, so that the certainty equivalent operator is ''smooth at certainty''; again, 1 y ␣ is the agent's Ž . risk aversion coefficient for timeless gambles, and 1r 1 y is the agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution for deterministic consumption Ž . streams. Rather than looking at the expected utility case in which ␣ s and the more general smooth case separatelyᎏthe former being encompassed by the latterᎏTable VI repeats the experiment from Table II , giving requisite percentage increases in consumption, for various combinations of the parameters ␣ and , for a switch from certainty to a realistic variance of the disturbances to consumption. The results for the expected utility case can be seen by restricting attention to the diagonal elements of the table.
While there is a change in the pattern of the resulting welfare costs as the parameters governing intertemporal substitution and risk aversion vary, the upper bound on the cost figures is essentially unchanged. The maximum value again occurs at the highest degree of risk aversion and smallest elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and is again roughly a 0.7% increase in initial consumption. On the diagonal of the tableᎏwhere Ž . 1y␣s1r1y , and expected utility obtainsᎏthe costs with autocorrelated disturbances are indistinguishable from their counterparts in the
What is significantly different in Table VI is that now, with a high degree of autocorrelation in the disturbances, the cost values are less Ž sensitive to changes in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, 1r 1 y . , and more sensitive to changes in the degree of risk aversion, 1 y ␣. For a given value of the risk aversion coefficient, the costs rise only slightly as the agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution falls from 1r2 to 1r20. In contrast, for a given value elasticity of the intertemporal substitution, the costs rise sharply as 1 y ␣ moves in the direction of greater risk aversion. Furthermore, compared with the results in Table II , costs ''below the diagonal''ᎏwhere the coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ᎏare higher, while those ''above the diagonal''ᎏwhere the risk aversion coefficient is than the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution ᎏare smaller.
Results for First-order Risk-a¨erse Certainty Equi¨alents
For the first-order risk-averse specification, the effect of added persistence in the disturbances is more dramatic than in the smooth certainty equivalent specification. The results are reported in Table VII. The maximum cost value is roughly 2.4% for a switch from certainty to a realistic variance. This maximum occurs at the combination of parameters Ž . where risk aversion is greatest ␥ s 0.70 and the elasticity of intertempo-Ž Ž . . ral substitution is largest 1r 1 y s 1r2 . Even for less extreme amounts of risk aversion, thoughᎏ␥ s 0.87, for exampleᎏcosts as high as 0.88%, or about $177 per person per year, are possible. 12 Furthermore, as 12 By way of contrast, if we restricted attention to binary gambles with equally likely w x outcomes, as in Pemberton 11 , the value of the risk parameter, denoted ␤, for which Pemberton calculates a cost of 1.09% in the linear-trend-plus-i.i.d.-disturbances case would correspond to a value of ␥ of roughly 0.125 here. Conversely, our extreme of risk aversion Ž . Ž . ␥s0.7 would lie somewhere between risk neutrality ␤ s 0 and the next smallest risk Ž . parameter Pemberton considers ␤ s 1 . In Pemberton's framework, values of the parameter ␤ ) 0 ''adjust'' the probability of the worse outcome upward, much as ␥ does here. A value of ␤ s 1 would increase the probability of the worse outcome from 1r2 to 2r3. in the smooth case just considered, varying the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, for a given value of ␥ , now has relatively less effect on the cost figures than in the i.i.d. case.
A Consumption Process with Permanent Innovations
Last, we turn to the case where the growth rate of consumption follows Ž . Ž . an AR 1 processᎏi.e., consumption growth obeys 6 , implying that in levels, the logarithm of consumption follows a random walk with upward drift. This is the form for per capita consumption used by Mehra and w x w x Prescott 9 and Epstein and Zin 2 in their studies of the equity premium puzzle. An implication of this specification is that disturbances to consumption have permanent effects on the level of consumption. The experiments in this section, as in the sections above, consider a change from a world of certainty to a ''realistic'' environment, within the framework of the posited consumption process. In other words, we consider a switch from a world in which the growth rate of consumption has a zero variance, and is simply c rc s 1 q g, to one in which of the growth rate obeys 
Results for Smooth Certainty Equi¨alents
We initially set ␥ s 1, and examine the welfare cost of fluctuations in consumption growth, using ''smooth'' certainty equivalents to describe the agent's risk preferences. Table VIII gives the requisite percentage in- creases in consumption, for various combinations of the risk aversion parameter ␣ and the intertemporal substitution parameter , needed to compensate the agent for a switch from a world of certainty to a world with a realistic variance of consumption growth. Some of the resulting increases in consumption are, in fact, quite large. The maximum valueᎏa roughly 4.3% increases in consumptionᎏoccurs at the highest degree of risk aversion, 1 y ␣ s 20, and the largest elastic-Ž . ity of intertemporal substitution, 1r 1 y s 1r2. In per capita dollar terms, an increase in consumption of that magnitude corresponds to roughly $863 per person per year. Even at the more moderate degrees of risk aversion of 5 and 10, costs near 1% and 2% of per capita consumption ᎏor $200 to $400 per personᎏare possible with this consumption process, even in this ''smooth'' case.
The expected utility case is once again had by looking at the diagonal elements of the table. For this case, the costs are substantially smaller, ranging from about 0.35% to 0.53% of consumption, or, in dollar terms, from about $70 per person per year to about $106 per person per year.
While some of the costs in this experiment are certainly quite large compared to their counterparts in the previous experiments with trend-stationary consumptionᎏparticularly the costs associated with parameter combinations which correspond to higher risk aversion and greater willingness to substitute intertemporallyᎏit is worth noting that in Epstein and w x Zin's 3 empirical estimation of the parameters of this utility process, they found in none of their estimations a value of 1 y ␣ even as large as 1.40. As the table shows, for a degree of risk aversion, 1 y ␣ , equal even to two, the maximum cost is less than 0.35% of initial consumption, or $70 per person per year.
Results for First-order Risk-a¨erse Certainty Equi¨alents
Some of the cost numbers obtained in the previous section are quite large as far as welfare cost estimates goᎏcompared, for example, to
Harberger's estimates of the gains from eliminating monopoly. In the following experiments, we will see that costs of an even greater magnitude are possible when first-order risk aversion combines with a consumption Ž . process like 6 , in which disturbances to consumption have permanent effects. Table IX gives the requisite percentage increase in consumption for a switch from certainty to a realistic variance of consumption growth for various values of the risk aversion parameter ␥ , ranging again from 0.99 down to 0.70, and values of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution Ž . 1r1y ranging from 1r2 to 1r20.
Ž . The maximum cost value, which occurs at ␥ s 0.70 and 1r 1 y s 1r2, is 22.9162ᎏa compensating increase in initial consumption of nearly 23%. In dollar terms, this is about $4600 per person per year. Of course, ␥ s 0.70 might be considered a very extreme degree of risk aversion. But, for even small departures from risk neutrality, the costs can become quite large. For example, when ␥ s 0.87, the costs, in percentage terms, range from just under 1% at the lowest elasticity of intertemporal substitution to about 7.6% at the highest. In per capita annual dollar terms, these costs are in the rough range of $200᎐$1500 per person per year. For ␥ s 0.75, the costs range from 3.32% to 12.73% of initial consumption, or from about $600 to $2500 per person per year.
If we think back to the ''willingness to pay'' calculations discussed above, taking ␥ s 0.87 and ␣ s 0.75 implied a willingness to pay about $24 to avoid the $250 gamble and about $21,000 to avoid the $74,000 gamble. For those parameter values, depending on the agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the welfare cost of fluctuations in the growth rate of consumption of the magnitude experienced in the post-war United States is in the range of 1% to 7% of consumptionᎏby no means a negligible cost. When shocks to consumption have permanent effectsᎏas in the experiments just performedᎏit is natural to wonder to what extent the large cost figures obtained in this case can truly be ascribed to business cycles, rather than to reduced growth. In this section I will present some evidence that the welfare costs obtained in those experiments are in fact distinct from ''growth costs,'' andᎏin line with one of Lucas's basic pointsᎏthose costs are still smaller than the costs of reduced growth, despite their large absolute size. In this sense, the results in this paper do not overturn Lucas's conclusion that the costs of reduced growth are large relative to the cost of business cycles; only Lucas's conclusion that the latter costs are actually negligible in an absolute sense is in question.
To explore the cost of reduced growth vis-a-vis the cost of fluctuations, Ì consider the following experiment: keeping the long-run variance of consumption growth at its realistic level, I ask, what percentage increase in consumption would be needed to compensate the agent for a one percentage point decrease in the long-run growth rate of consumption. For the ''smooth'' certainty equivalent case, the requisite percentage increases in consumption are given in Table X. As is clear from a comparison of Table X with Table VIII , the costs of slower growth dwarf the costs associated with fluctuation for all combinations of parameters. The costs of reduced growth are particularly large where the agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution is high, and decline as this elasticity falls. While there is some influence of risk aversion, it is small.
Costs of a similar magnitude are obtained in the first-order risk-averse Ž . case with ␣ s 1 , the results for which are shown in Table XI. In fact, except for the two most extreme degrees of risk aversion, ␥ equal to 0.75 and 0.70, the costs of slower growth shown in Table XI are strikingly similar to those shown in Table X . Their pattern is dominated by the agent's elasticity of intertemporal substitution, with requisite consumption increases in the rough neighborhoods of 28%, 15%, 8%, and 4% as the agent's substitution elasticity is either 1r2, 1r5, 1r10, or 1r20, respectively. Compared to the increases required to compensate for fluctuations in the growth rate of consumption, the increases in consumption required to compensate for a one percentage point slower long-run growth rate range from roughly twice as large to 70 times as large. Numbers of a similar magnitude and pattern obtain if one performs the analogous experiment with either of the other two processes posited for consumption, the one exception being that, for the two deterministic-trend specifications, the costs of slower growth fall with greater risk aversion, although the impact of variation in the risk aversion parameters is even more negligible in those cases. Lucas's conclusion that the welfare costs of slower growth are large in an absolute sense is thus a very robust oneᎏeven if individuals are relatively unwilling to substitute consumption over time, whether or not they are not particularly risk averse, and for several possible processes governing aggregate consumption, the welfare costs of slower long-run consumption growth are enormous.
CONCLUSIONS
What conclusions can be drawn from these experiments? Like Lucas, I do not intend these numbers to be taken as precise estimates of the cost of business cycles. Rather, I want only to show that for what I believe are plausible alternatives to the standard preference specification, and alternative processes for aggregate consumption, large costs are possible. One and one-half percent of current consumption, or two percentᎏboth large numbersᎏare in the ballpark, in fact in the infield. If one allows that an individual's risk preferences may be better described by something other than the standard, isoelastic expected utility framework, one must be open to at least the possibility that business cycles do have large welfare consequences. More to the point, I think it would be premature to write off stabilization as a possible goal of business cycle theory.
Not surprisingly, the results also show that what one means by ''business cycle fluctuations in consumption'' has a large impact on the calculated costs imposed by those fluctuations. Whether business cycle fluctuations are essentially transitory disturbances to an otherwise smoothly growing consumption path, or they have permanent effects on the level of consumption, matters a great deal for the size of the welfare costs one obtains. One lesson that might be drawn from this sensitivity of the results is that, while there is clearly something attractive in the simplicity of the sort of w x Ž ''back-of-the-envelope'' calculations in Lucas 8 and albeit on a larger . envelope here, the question of the costliness of business cycles is perhaps not well posed outside of a particular model of business cycles.
One final way of thinking about the results is to think simply in terms of the range of numbersᎏthe one ''safe'' conclusion is that the cost of business cycles lies somewhere between 1r10% and 23% of annual consumptionᎏwhich suggests that we need a better understanding of individuals' attitudes toward risk before we can safely draw conclusions about the cost of business cycles. Whether deviations from the standard specification of risk preferences have a significant impact on positive business cycle theory is a question for further research. 13 
APPENDIX
The solution technique which I employᎏwhich involves normalizing growing lifetime utility to render it stationary, then iteratively solving a functional equationᎏis similar under any of the three alternative consumption processes, although the normalizations differ, and the resulting functional equations thus differ somewhat. In all cases the uncertainty is ''discretized'' down to a finite-state Markov chain, and the functional equations are solved via iterative techniques common in dynamic programming problems. following a first-order autoregressive process, the stochastic process for lifetime utility, which will be growing over time, 14 can be normalized in the 13 w x See 4 for a recent exploration along these lines. 14 Note that ''lifetime utility'' at date t is utility from date t onward as of date tᎏi.e., undiscounted.
For computational purposes, the processes for the disturbances are the extent that other features of the distribution seem relevant for risk calculations ᎏe.g., existence or nonexistence of ''two-'' or greater events or features of the cumulative distribution functionᎏone would like to incorporate that information. This seems particularly the case when considering, as we are here, a variant on Yaari certainty equivalents, which are nonlinear in probabilities. In practice, though, given the forms specified above for the outcomes, it is difficult to select n and the p 's so that i Ž . n Ž . n with probabilities p matches even a rough histogram of a i is1 i is1
given distribution. For the distributions at hand, a good but by no means perfect approximation was had with n s 8 and Ž . ns2 and p s , ᎏindicate that the results reported above are robust, 2 2 at least in terms of orders of magnitude. Given that our purpose here is not so much to give a precise estimate of the cost of business cycles as it is to provide rough indications of possible magnitudes, robustness to this extent seems satisfactory.
Ž . w Ž .x Now, let G P s G P be the matrix of ''Yaari-adjusted'' Then, given the particular form of the certainty equivalent which I employ, and the n-state Markov chains for the processes, the ''functional equations'' in¨to be solved are for the stochastic growth case. Both are simply systems of n equations in n unknowns. Given the recursivity, however, the most efficient way to solve these systems is iteratively, as in dynamic programming problems. I thus
